Conventions and democracy by Hough, Barry
 CONVENTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
The purpose of this article is to consider how the introduction of a special
Parliamentary select committee could extend democratic influences in the
evolution of binding non-legal constitutional practices.1 Following a
consideration of other possible avenues of reform, it will be suggested that
whilst political actors should continue both to initiate new conventional
practices, and to interpret and to adapt existing ones, an enhanced
parliamentary engagement in the scrutiny  of conventions would contribute to a
more accountable government. There should be a systematic parliamentary
participation in the debate surrounding the evolution and interpretation of
conventions, which would require the executive to justify and explain
constitutional change.  A unique kind of select committee having special orders
of reference is proposed to fulfil these purposes.
Background and Context
If Constitutions are about resolving the struggle of rival contenders for power,
New Labour's claims for its People's Constitution falls to be  evaluated in that
context.  It  suggests a radical re-alignment in favour of the regions, local
communities and the individual.2 Devolution for Northern Ireland, Scotland
and to a lesser extent in Wales3, the enactment of the European Convention on
Human Rights4, the abolition of the hereditary peers' right to sit and vote in the
Lords5, new governmental structures for London, including a directly elected
mayor, with  extensive powers over such matters as transport, police, culture
and the environment6  proclaim a resolve to  reunite power with the people.
But this is not all.  To these proposed measures must be added  proposals for
the radical reform of  local government7 that promises elected mayors in cities
outside London, local referendums, more frequent local elections, an end to
                                                          
1  Hereinafter the term conventions will be used.
2  Labour first committed itself to this policy in Meet the Challenge: Make the Change, Labour Party,
1989.
3  See the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998.
4  The Human Rights Act 1998.
5  The House of Lords Bill 1999
6  Greater London Authority Bill 1998
7  White Paper, Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People Cm  4014.
2rate capping,  as well as  published "best value" audits to replace Compulsory
Competitive Tendering.
Central Government will not escape  continuing reform designed to enhance
the openness and accountability of the administration.   The Select Committee
on Public Administration is conducting a wide ranging study into how central
government can be made effectively and properly accountable to the citizen for
the services it provides.8  This study will consider mechanisms for ensuring
accountability, openness, arrangements for appointments to public bodies, as
well as ways of democratising the administration by an increased public
participation in the design, monitoring and implementation of policy which
affects them.
But there are already doubts about the likely achievement of the 'People's
Constitution'.    Notoriously, the Human Rights Act 1998 does not entitle the
courts  to disapply any  Act of Parliament which might violate human rights.
And the bold proposals for the reform of local government seem unlikely to be
fully implemented.9   The devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament  does
not entirely liberate Scotland from the centralised control of Westminster.10
And there is a reluctance on the part of government to address the asymmetry
of  United Kingdom government under which the citizens of the English
regions have less autonomy than their Welsh and Scottish counterparts.11
Moreover,  the related but separate question of progress towards reform of the
                                                          
8  This was announced in Press Notice No 37 Session 1997-98, 13 November 1998.
9  The Local Government Bill 1999 replaces CCT with a duty to achieve best value in the performance
of council services, but many of the other radical proposals of the White Paper  have been abandoned.
10  The Scotland Act 1998, s.28 (7)  states that the Parliament of the United Kingdom's power to make
laws for Scotland is unaffected by the devolution of law making powers to the Scottish Parliament. The
Westminster Parliament  will also provide resources for the Scottish Parliament.
11   Regional Development Agencies will be created under the Regional Development Agencies Act
1998.  They will  formulate policies  designed inter alia to promote the economic development  of their
area.  The Agencies, for which there will one for each region listed in Schedule 1 of the 1998 Act,  are
to be comprised of between 8 and 15 members appointed by the Secretary of State.  By their remit and
composition  the Agencies fall significantly short of addressing the democratic asymmetry between
England on the one hand and Wales and Scotland on the other.   Only London will have an elected
body.   It is true, however, that regional development agencies may be accountable  to regional
chambers (where they exist in the RDA's jurisdiction) and must take into account the views of the
regional chamber (s.8 of the 1998 Act).  They can be required by the secretary of state to furnish it with
information and answer its questions under s.18 of the 1998 Act.  The present government is unwilling
to allow the English regions to have that greater autonomy which would allow them to go beyond the
remit of the Regional Development Agencies, perhaps by establishing their own Parliaments.  This is
so  notwithstanding that the logic of devolution is towards a federal structure for the UK.  Whether this
imbalance will prove to be satisfactory  will depend  in part upon the future reaction  to devolution of
the English, for whom, at present, the issue seems to be neither  live nor controversial.
3electoral system seems tardy.  Similarly overdue is  a Freedom of Information
Act.
There are also profoundly  undemocratic elements of the constitution which
escape the reforming gaze altogether. Principal amongst these is the system of
conventions of the constitution which, notwithstanding their profound effects,
inhabit the darker almost furtive regions of political consciousness.12
Conventions have allowed politicians to acquire former monarchical powers
ostensibly to create by informal means a system of responsible and accountable
government which is still absent in the formal constitution.   The   formation,
adaptation and deletion of conventions is a continuing process which allows the
Executive to determine what the constitution is.  Rules which have the purpose
of limiting autocratic power can now be used by governments to  determine
their own powers, albeit that this may be subject to the constraints both of
public and media pressure and the scrutiny of parliamentary select
committees.13  As we shall see conventions are often  established in the absence
of the participation of democratic institutions or accountable individuals.
The System of Conventions: Preliminary Remarks
                                                          
12  Whilst the general system of conventions has received scant political attention, particularly in the
context of devolution,   the particular conventions of ministerial responsibility, which have  proved to
be central to the working of the constitution, have been examined in recent years.    In particular, the
true scope of the principle of individual ministerial responsibility to parliament and the relationship
between ministers and civil servants has  been subjected to particularly close scrutiny.   The Scott
Inquiry into arms sales to Iraq (Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-
Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions HC (1995-1996) 115) in which ministers were found to
have given inaccurate, incomplete or misleading answers to Parliament, the Nolan Inquiry into
Standards in Public Life (1995) as well as  in the controversies surrounding such events as the
dismissal of  the Head of the Prison Services Agency, Derek Lewis,  and the Westland affair in 1986
have all been prominent in arousing controversy and criticism as has the major re-structuring of
government involving the creation of Executive Agencies.    But this  criticism  has generally been
focused on establishing a greater clarity of the scope of ministerial obligations as well as due respect
for them.  The broader question of the suitability of the present regime for establishing and enforcing
standards of behaviour through conventions and the tensions between the stated political imperatives of
devolving  power and enhancing accountability has not effectively been addressed.
13  See e.g., Public Service Committee: First Report, (1996-97), Ministerial Accountability and
Responsibility HC 234.
4The foreigner newly arrived on these shores might well find it quixotic that a
government proclaiming the "people's constitution" appeared  passive in the
face of Vernon Bogdanor's  bon-mot that it is not  Parliament but the
government of the day which determines what the constitution is.14    Brazier
has concluded that "(t)here is no British culture which regards the constitution
as belonging to everyone, rather than just the Government of the day."15
Indeed, Hennessy has gone further and argued that the system of conventions is
not only the architecture of the executive but also that it is so mysteriously
elusive that  it is not possible for the citizen even to know what the constitution
is, let alone influence its content.16   And Gladstone's dictum that the British
Constitution presumes more boldly than any other  the good faith of those who
work it is hardly compatible with the principle of accountable government
upon which the modern constitution is supposed to be founded.17
The absence of reflection is regrettable now that the United Kingdom has
crossed the threshold of a fundamentally altered constitutional stage under
which power has been devolved to Scotland  and Wales.    This major re-
alignment of power will inevitably lead the constitution towards a rich vein of
new conventional practices necessary both to manage aspects of the
relationship between the devolved institutions and the United Kingdom
Parliament and the internal operation of these institutions.  The former is
particularly important because the legal settlement is not sufficiently
comprehensive to solve some of the major questions which remain to be
addressed.  Future conventional practice may, for example, supply the answer
to the question  of who should advocate  Scottish and Welsh interests in
Europe?   The same may be true in  matters of domestic policy, where a settled
practice may evolve as to who should be the appropriate advocate of English
interests.  Conventions may also come to limit the  influence which Scottish
and Welsh MPs will have on exclusively English policies.   More
controversially, conventions may become paramount in preventing conflict
between a devolved institution and the United Kingdom Parliament.   Although
the legal boundaries of the devolved settlements may be statutorily determined
it is not impossible to imagine pragmatic future adjustments of power by
                                                          
14  V. Bogdanor, quoted in Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring, Gollancz, 1995 at p. 26
15  Brazier New Labour, New Constitution (1998) 49 NILQ 1, 6.
16  Hennessy, loc.cit. esp. at p. 45-6.
17  Gleanings of Past Years, vol. 1 (John Murray: 1879), p. 275.
5conventional means in order to avoid outright conflict between the two
Parliaments or the two legal systems.18
The present order under which government of the day is the mid-wife of the
conventional practice stands against the logic of devolving power. The question
of making constitutional evolution more accountable goes far beyond the
devolution question, but it is this issue which, perhaps more than others, most
underscores the importance of addressing the democratic deficit in the
evolution and re-invention of fundamental aspects of the UK constitution.  Can
New Labour's People's Constitution be meaningful without a more radical
reform including measures to democratise conventions?
(i)  The Creation of Conventions
Central to the proposal for reform is the nature of conventions, their source,
and the means by which they are established.  Conventions are at the kernel of
an "insider's constitution".19  The weakness of Parliament,  which   has been
criticised as a mere mask for party power,20 has been inadequate to democratise
this heartland of our constitution. Scrutiny is compromised where members of
parliament behave as partisans rather than as parliamentarians.
First it is necessary to acknowledge the notorious absence of agreement
amongst writers of authority about what constitutes a convention.21
Conventions, as distinguished from mere habits, practices or usages,  are
generally accepted as prescriptive and mandate certain behaviour as either
constitutionally desirable or necessary.  The definition offered by Sir Ivor
Jennings is widely  accepted22.  He stated that the fulfilment of  three tests is
                                                          
18  Perhaps this might arise if the Scottish courts applied an Act of the Scottish Parliament passed in
respect of a reserved matter notwithstanding that such a measure would  formally be invalid: see
Scotland Act 1998, s28 and Schedules 4 and 5.
19  See generally Hennessy loc. cit. at p. 86 who refers to "the enduring golden triangle" of Cabinet
Office, No 10 and Buckingham Palace.  Questions of Procedure for Ministers, dating from at least
1945, is an example of this "inner" process and shows how the Executive has framed and amended
rules on accountability for itself.  The rules the code contained  were established by respective Prime
Ministers, not Parliament.  Only following the traumas of the Scott Inquiry has Parliament approved
part of the new Ministerial Code.  See now Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office, July 1997, and the
Resolutions of the House of Commons and House of Lords  on ministerial accountability (H.C. Debs.,
vol. 292 cols. 1046-7, March 19th 1997; HL Debs., cols. 1055-62, March 20th 1997).
20  A Marr,  Ruling Britannia, Michael Joseph: 1995 pp. 138-9.
21  See generally Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law, Butterworths 1987, and Alder, Constitutional
and Administrative Law 3rd edition, Macmillan, 1999.
22 But has been subject to criticism, see e.g., J. Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional Conventions
(1999) 19 Legal Studies 24.
6necessary to identify a convention.23  First, are there any precedents; secondly,
do those operating the constitution believe that they are bound by a rule?
thirdly, is there a constitutional reason for the convention? This  has been
accepted by the Canadian courts.24
Central to the present argument is to identify who influences the establishment
of conventions.  Who participates in the process?  It appears that conventions
often evolve from practices of government, and may only be accorded
constitutional status when it is accepted and recognised that the practice
prescribes certain behaviour.25  Agreement that the practice should be
obligatory is a self conscious means of creating a convention. Alternatively, a
convention may derive from an expectation that an existing practice must be
observed. Consent is also important in this second alternative because,  in its
absence, there would be no expectation that freedom of behaviour is
constrained by the need to follow the practice.   If that expectation no longer
survives  the obligation to observe the practice ceases and the convention
disappears.26
The difficulty which has never satisfactorily been resolved, is to identify whose
consent must be forthcoming. Does it depend on the opinion of  the community
of political actors? If so, who are these?  Does it require their unanimity?  Is
merely a consensus required?   The issue is an important one when it has to be
decided whether a convention has been either breached or altered or destroyed.
The failure to resolve these central questions appears from typical statements of
respected authorities.  For example, De Smith and Brazier  suggest that a
convention arises only when the usage is accepted by everyone whom it affects
as well as 'authorities' on   constitutional affairs who believe that this behaviour
is mandatory.27  This avowal of a plutocratic system is common to many
                                                          
23   Law and the Constitution, 5th edition, 1959, p.136 .
24  Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos 1, 2 and 3) (1982) 125 DLR (3d) 1.
25   The  convention that the royal assent should not be refused is an example of this.  It is described in
De Smith & Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th edn (Penguin: 1994).
26  E.g. the Tables Officer has abandoned the previous practice of blocks on parliamentary questions:
see the Public Service Committee's 2nd Report on Ministerial Accountability and Responsibility HC
313.
27  De Smith & Brazier, loc. cit. p. 41.  Andrew Marr's work suggests that the opinions of authoritative
and influential political actors carry much weight.  See A Marr loc cit.
7writers of authority.28     There is no suggestion amongst them that democratic
participation is necessary.
 One possibility is that  conventions can only be created or sustained where
there is a consensus amongst   political actors that a practice has become or
should remain binding.29  If the obligation to observe a practice is only
sustained where unanimity is required every breach would destroy the
convention since each political actor who might be thought to be bound by a
convention could destroy it by a withdrawal of that consent.
If this is correct there  remains to be identified the relevant group or groups
amongst whom a consensus should be identified. Commentators such as
Hennessy,30 Marr31 and Horwitz32  expose a system in which the  interpretation
of the constitution, and especially of conventional practice, is a matter for
ministers, the cabinet office, civil servants and palace officials.  These are the
individuals who are most likely to have access to information about the
precedents, which means that it is they who will interpret and thereby give
meaning to the rules. Even De Smith and Brazier conclude that royal
counsellors and civil servants are likely to be the custodians of this knowledge
which may only be revealed publicly when it is no longer sensitive or
controversial.33
Sometimes conventions can arise from the actions of merely one of these
groups of actors. For example, ministers can  create conventions without
recourse to Parliament. There are many possible examples, of which two may
be offered.34  In the first of these the Cabinet, without consulting Parliament,
probably created a convention in 1946 relating to ministerial memoirs,35 and
                                                          
28  Sir Kenneth Wheare, for example, defined  conventions as  "rule(s) of behaviour accepted as
obligatory by those concerned in the working of the constitution", Modern Constitutions,  p. 122.  
Professor O Hood Phillips,    stated that conventions are  "rules of political practice which are regarded
a binding upon those to whom they apply." Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th edition, 1987,
p. 113.
29   See Jaconelli supra.
30   Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring, Gollancz: 1995
 31  A Marr loc. cit.
32   Morton J Horwitz,   Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical? [1997] OJLS 551.
33  De Smith  & Brazier loc. cit p. 43 point to the significance of political and royal biographies.
34  Questions of Procedure for Ministers (now the Ministerial Code) is an example promulgated  by the
Prime Minister.
35   See Report of the Radcliffe Committee on Ministers' Memoirs Cmnd 6386 (1976) paras 1 and 2.
8purported to do so in 1924 when it resolved that no politically sensitive
prosecutions could proceed without Cabinet approval.36
This is not to say that the process of creating conventions is altogether
impervious to the external influences of public opinion and media campaigns.
Public pressure may be relevant in persuading politicians that   practices  might
become conventions, or lose their conventional status.  Max Beloff's
contribution to The Times37 questioned the practice of almost twenty year's
standing (a convention?) which maintained that no new hereditary peers should
be created.  No doubt Government advisers, attuned to the faintest vibration of
public opinion,  offered appropriate advice before this important constitutional
practice was changed the following year.     Interpretational disputes have also
been  debated in  The Times, as occurred in  1950 concerning  the
circumstances in which the sovereign might refuse a dissolution.38
Nevertheless, the process by which governmental practice becomes
constitutional is largely one which takes place in the absence of public scrutiny
and debate.   The weakness of Parliament in the scrutiny of the executive is
both an argument for reform and a a warning about  the very substance of it.39
(ii)  The Purposes of Conventions
Conventions serve a number of purposes not all of which are easy companions
of  democratic and representative government.  At one level it is possible to
assert that conventions rather than laws have  provided an important
evolutionary mechanism for the progress from a monarchical to a democratic
constitution without the need for a series of divisive statutes repealing the
sovereign's legal powers.40  Others, including  Horwitz, for instance,  have
argued  that  conventions were developed as undemocratic devices to reassure
the ruling class that constitutional fundamentals would continue to be
developed within government largely beyond the influence of the rising middle
                                                          
36  Cabinet Minute of August 6th, 1924, see  Parl Debs H.C. vol 179 cols 345-355. Jaconelli loc. cit.
suggests that an agreement could only become conventional if  regular compliance were subsequently
observed.
37   The Times 1st November 1982
38  The Times 24 April 1950, (Lord Simon, former Lord Chancellor), 26th April 1950  (Roy Jenkins)
and 2nd May 1950 (Sir Alan Lascelles, but the letter was published under a pseudonym).
39  The proposal considered below is that a select committee should be established but that it should be
advised by a panel of experts from outside the political process.
40  A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional Law, 12th edition, (Longman: 1997) at p. 24.
9classes following rapid extension of the franchise after the Reform Act 1867.41
Conventions, according to this interpretation,  fortify a class barricade against
the triumph of democracy.  This makes it all the more surprising that New
Labour has omitted reform of conventions from its People's Constitution.42
(iii) Conventions as Limits on Governmental Power
    If the purpose of  a constitution is to impose external controls on
government, then conventions which are generated within government must
invite concern.   As we have seen, conventions may be established, abandoned
or altered at will by the Executive, often without reference to Parliament.  Even
those  conventions which have the fundamental role of establishing key parts of
the constitution of responsible government are not immune from subtle re-
definition.  Concerns are aroused when such a re-formulation dilutes the
obligations of those advocating the change. For example, the conservative
government notoriously advocated a supposed distinction between ministerial
responsibility and ministerial accountability which was probably intended to
limit the then existing conventional obligations of ministers43  But by what
authority do such  individuals  determine the nature shape and timing of the
reforms which conventions introduce?
(iv)  Conventions and the Constitution
There is a problem that conventions obscure the constitution.  This raises three
issues.  The first of these is that conventions offer a  conception of  the
constitution that assumes that change and flux are continuous and permanent.
At any one time it would be impossible for the scholar to identify which
practices have constitutional status as some are falling into desuetude whilst
                                                          
41   Morton J Horwitz,     Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical? [1997] OJLS 551.
42   Some might argue that in this omission  Labour identifies its new constituency.
43    See  Taking Forward Continuity and Change Cm 2748  pp 27-8;  see also the Armstrong
Memorandum of 1st December 1987.    The accountability/responsibility distinction was in substance
accepted by the Scott Inquiry (Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-
Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions HC (1995-1996) 115 Section K Vol. IV) and Sir Richard
Scott writing extra judicially [1996] PL 410.  But it has not been universally upheld: see The 2nd
Report of the Public Service Committee  (1995-6) HC 313,  para 21 which  rejected  the  bifurcation of
accountability and responsibility and doubted whether in practice the distinction could be made.
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others are emerging.44   This means that there is always a debate about which
practices are constitutional. The fundamentally important Prime Ministerial
document Questions of Procedure for Ministers which governed, inter alia, the
scope and meaning of ministerial responsibility to Parliament once inhabited
this disputed terra incognita. 45
Second, where fundamental conventional rules are acknowledged, their scope
and application is subject to debate. (E.g. the powers of the sovereign to refuse
a dissolution).  This simply raises the pragmatic problem that in the fog and
smoke of a dynamic system the curious surveyor cannot fully delineate the
squares and avenues  of the constitution, and that  this can only properly be the
task entrusted to  the retrospective gaze of the historian.46 But there is a third
less pragmatic reason why the mystery of the constitution will be impenetrable
to contemporary study. This relates to the enduring endemic secrecy of British
government and its mistrust of open debate.   Hennessy has discovered that it is
impossible for the citizen to know what the constitution is, for the answer lies
in  a file of precedents held in the private office of the Cabinet Secretary.47
Presumably only the initiates of the civil service and ministers  are admitted to
behold the contents of the file, and the application of the precedents it contains
lies within their exclusive judgment.  It is understood that it is not made
available to Parliament.
(v)  The Frailty of Conventional Principles.
Conventions mean that certain practices of politicians vary legal rules. It is trite
law that the Sovereign's legal powers are vastly different in substance from
those which she is constitutionally permitted to exercise. There may be
historical reasons why this is so, but does it remain necessary to neutralise
redundant constitutional law by reference to undemocratic practices?   Is it
                                                          
44    Baldwin  quoted in Ivor Jennings, Cabinet  Government, Cambridge University Press 1936, p.12.
45   See now Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office July 1997, and the Resolutions of the House of
Commons and House of Lords  on ministerial accountability (H.C. Debs., vol. 292 cols. 1046-7, March
19th 1997; HL Debs., cols. 1055-62, March 20th 1997.
46  This may be so, but it is equally an issue where some laws are concerned.  However, the courts
provide  a mechanism for the interpretation of legal rules. Parliament may deliberately enact laws in
which the meaning of statutory words is  unclear. This relies  on the courts to supply meaning.  For
example, many questions surrounding the possible meaning of  working time in the Working Time
Regulations 1998 SI 1998/1833  have deliberately been  left to judiciary to determine.   The absence of
such  an institution means that conventions are liable to be interpreted by those who are bound by the
rule itself.  If a sufficient consensus exists an inconvenient rule can simply be ignored and the
constitutional  obligation itself destroyed.
47 Hennessy, loc.cit. at p.45-6.
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possible to adhere to that aspect of the Rule of Law which is concerned with
universality of law, that the law as administered is the law as declared?     The
logic of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Fire Brigades
Union48 is that   government does not possess the power to disapply the law.
Diceyan orthodoxy has it that the defining characteristic of a convention (as
opposed to a law) is that it is incapable of judicial enforcement. It is a political
question whether breach of a convention attracts a sanction; indeed conventions
are so fluid that a breach (where no objection is raised) could destroy the
convention breached. Important constitutional values are thus given life in
mechanisms which are exceedingly  vulnerable.    Mass and disciplined
political parties enthused by ideological purposes are, when in government,
effectively unrestrained  by a "flexible" constitution,  which may simply
dissolve before them.  The likely impending confrontation between the
government and hereditary peers over the abolition of their voting rights
provides one context in which a group with limited democratic credentials may
press their agenda in defiance of the elected government, and convention will
be inadequate to prevent it. The  failure of the former government's
conventional relationship with Parliament was also revealed in the Scott
Inquiry.  This concluded that numerous examples came to light of ministers
failing to give full information about the policies, decisions and actions of
government regarding arms sales to Iraq49 and that this undermined the
democratic process.50  Answers to parliamentary questions in the affair had
been "designedly uninformative"51 because of a fear of adverse political
consequences if the truth were revealed.
The Future of Conventions
 Many scholars have speculated whether the solution to these difficulties lies in
converting constitutional practices into legal rules.  According to one argument
the advantage of this might be to enhance both certainty, and durability, and
provide a mechanism for the enforcement of constitutional obligation.  This is
not without its disadvantages, and this is considered further below.  A  less
                                                          
48   [1995] 2 WLR 1.  See further, Raz The Rule of Law and its Virtue (1977) 93 LQR 195.  However,
the proposals in this article designed to enhance the democratic legitimacy of conventions do not fully
address this problem.
49  Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and
Related Prosecutions HC (1995-1996) 115, K8.1 para 27.
50   Ibid. D4.56-D4.58.(D. 3.107).
51  Ibid. D. 3.107.
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ambitious version of this model for reform posits the familiar suggestion that
some individual conventions might  "crystallise" into law52 whereas a
comprehensive transposition would constitute the codification of conventions.
Crystallisation
 Allan  suggests that in recognising a convention the courts may express
approval for the principle that underlies it.53  As he argues, the law/politics
dichotomy disintegrates where courts  evolve a legal rule which underpins a
convention.  This is not without precedent and it would seem that the courts
can convert important practices into rules of law.  Examples of this include
Carltona Ltd v. Commissioner for Works54   R v. Home Secretary ex p Ruddock
55  and A-G v. Jonathan Cape Ltd.56
A counter argument to this kind of incorporation, at least if applied to most
conventions, is that it poses questions about a court's role under the separation
of powers.  If courts enforce conventions their existence becomes "fixed" as a
matter of law by judges rather than politicians. This recalls the familiar
argument that judges may be lead into the political arena.   It is also possible to
assert that the demands of political morality ought to be a matter of collective
decision reached through the medium of politics and so fall outside the proper
scope of the judicial function.
To take the example of ministerial responsibility, even if the obligations
underpinning this convention were enacted into law, the task of applying and
enforcing that obligation would considerably enlarge the judicial function
within the present understanding  of the separation of powers.  The allocation
of blame for a policy failure is a political matter not a legal issue.  This means
that the question whether a minister's  conduct in office is such that he or she
should resign would seem to be a non-justiciable question, depending as it does
on party support, the timing of the discovery,   the support of the prime
minister and cabinet and the public repercussions of it.57  As conventions are
                                                          
 52  T R S Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice, Clarendon, 1992. Contrast Munro  loc. cit. at p. 48 et seq.
53 T R S Allan, loc.cit.
54  [1943] 2 All ER 560.
55  [1987] 2 All   518.
56  [1976] QB 752.
57   But the issue is not so clear if a minister denied an obligation to answer any questions in the House
of Commons.  What would prevent the court granting a declaration that such behaviour was
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enforced as a  matter of political  dynamic, some argue that political flexibility
might  be curbed if  the courts were invited to pronounce on the breach of a
conventional obligation (assuming the courts were willing to do so).   There are
concerns about embroiling the courts in the political process, and it is by no
means certain that the courts would exercise a jurisdiction over  issues which
traditionally have not be seen as justiciable.  There is no doubt that issues such
as these are sensitive ones posing questions about the very nature of the judicial
function.
Codification of Conventions
 The case for codification often involves two distinct positions.  The first
asserts that conventions should both be codified and given legal force, perhaps
within a written constitution.   Alternatively,  conventions might be codified
within an authoritative text with no legal status and so remain as non legal
political practices as at present.58 The former position is tainted for the reasons
discussed above which are concerned with the unsuitability of the judicial
process to determine political questions.   The latter argument, which
represents "soft codification" is essentially a process of elucidation.  The
conventions so codified would be recognised as and declared as such.59  This
would address the undesirable lack of precision in the scope of some
conventions, and it would enable us to say with certainty which usages are and
which  are not conventional. For example, the present lack of agreement about
the conventional powers of the monarch to dissolve Parliament could result in
damage to the monarchy by accusations of political partiality if the power were
exercised. Establishing the certainty of conventions could safeguard the
neutrality of those who apply them.  60
 The first objection to this latter model of codification would be the obvious
practical difficulties in systematic codification. It is not possible at any one
time to list all practices which have constitutional status.  Political
                                                                                                                                                                     
unconstitutional?  It is also the case that conventions on ministerial conflicts of  interest exist in parallel
with the rule against bias in Administrative law.   Arguments such as these suggest that the case against
juridification can be over-stated.
58 Although even under this version, which has been adopted in Australia in relation to 34
constitutional practices, it is likely that Australian courts will cite those conventions which the process
recognised and declared.  C J G Sampford, "Recognize and Declare": an Australian Experience in
Codifying Constitutional Conventions. [1987] OJLS 369.
59  As in Australia.  See further below.
60  This was one purpose of codifying conventions in Australia, see Sampford  loc. cit. at p. 371.
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disagreement about the scope about some conventions might only be overcome
by compromise, perhaps entailing an unhelpful lack of clarity in drafting. Soft
codification would also place at risk the flexibility of the constitution  and
inhibit its evolutionary role in maintaining its relationship with contemporary
political values.61  This is of paramount importance in the UK at present
because of the constitutional adventure of devolution. As we have seen, future
tensions in the relationship between the UK parliament on the one hand, and
the devolved institutions of Scotland, Wales and N Ireland on the other are
unlikely to be avoided, especially if there are democratically supported
pressures for an increase in devolved powers.62    Solutions to these problems
will gradually emerge  as the new constitutional structure is made to function.
Its creation would not be assisted by any form of codification. Conventions will
also be developed within each devolved institution, and there may be conflict
between existing UK conventions and those of the devolved institutions.63
There are further objections apart from those associated with codification
immediately following fundamental constitutional change.  As far as those
obligations that were included in the code were concerned, further evolution
might not formally be precluded, but the weight of a codified precedent  would
surely establish a presumption in favour of continuity.  The purpose of
elucidating conventions in this manner would be to provide rules which
politicians should follow. Although codified practice might in theory   be
expected to develop, the reality would be that politicians would risk
controversy if they departed from an authoritatively declared precedent.  By
virtue of codification there would ex hypothesi be a strong presumption against
development and in favour of the status quo.  Would we today regard a
codified set of early nineteenth century conventions as beneficial?
The subsequent addition of new obligations outside the code would remain a
real likelihood.  The evolution of new conventions surrounding the code and
extending it  could itself question the value of this model of reform.  Finally,
                                                          
61  Although the achievement of conventions in modernising the constitution can be over-emphasised.
For example, the application for judicial review rather than the convention of ministerial responsibility
might have been a more effective means of making the executive accountable in the twentieth century.
62  It might become conventional that the UK Parliament would not resist claims for greater autonomy
if  this were a manifesto commitment supported by a majority of voters in an election.  The alternative
to this pragmatism might entail  conflict with grave consequences.
63  For example it need not follow that the Scottish Parliament would follow English practice in
relation to the conventions of ministerial responsibility.  An exclusively Scottish convention might
evolve regulating the relationship between Agency Chief Executives and Scottish Ministers.
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even codified rules have meaning only according to the interpretation placed
upon them.  Re-interpretation would not be prevented.
Summary
Thus far consideration has been given to the  debate about the form of
constitutional practices.  This debate contains  worthy underlying assumptions,
but fails to resolve serious problems.  The assumptions  are that many  of the
obligations which are currently conventions (whether or not enacted into law)
are worth preserving; that the constitution should evolve efficiently; and that
conventions  in their current form locate power in the hands of unaccountable
and unelected individuals. The unresolved problems are that judicial
enforcement of conventions following the crystallisation or hard codification
would lead to a new,   controversial and probably impossible role for the judges
under the separation of powers, as well as other constitutional arrangements.64
Soft codification (even if possible) would not preclude other non-codified
conventions from becoming established.    The problem has been to identify a
mechanism which will substantially achieve enhanced democratic control
without the deficiencies to which reference has been made.
A Role for Parliament65?
The undemocratic authorship of constitutional change would be less repugnant
if it were subject to more far-reaching scrutiny, challenge and debate.  This
suggests a role for a parliamentary body in scrutinising the establishment of
new conventions.  According to this proposal, two fundamental issues need to
be separated.  The first of these issues touches  upon the creation of new
conventions, their adaptation, interpretation,  application and deletion.  This is
                                                          
64  In the unlikely event that  the courts were to develop legal rules in parallel and co-extensive with the
convention of ministerial responsibility, they would not have the power to order that a minister who
violated those rules be dismissed from office; the matter would be non-justiciable.
65  The following discussion concerns the Westminster Parliament.  The Scottish Parliament and Welsh
Assembly will undoubtedly  also wish to evaluate and adapt the  conventions which will emerge within
their own jurisdictions, as well as  those which will come to regulate the relationship between
Westminster and the devolved institutions.  In the former case, for example,  Scottish conventions
might emerge governing the appointment of the Scottish First Minister.  In the latter category, there
will be conventions regulating the circumstances in which the Westminster Parliament might resist a
Scottish Bill receiving the Royal Assent where this Scottish  Bill ran counter to Westminster's policies.
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essentially a matter of identifying the constitutional structure, and monitoring
whether constitutional principles are respected and applied.  The second   issue
concerns  the  enforcement of those conventions which exist for the time being.
At present each of these issues is merely a matter of political judgment.
It is proposed that the evolution of new conventions, the re-forming and
adaptation of existing conventions, their application or deletion should
continue, as at present, to be a matter for those political actors who operate the
constitution.  Their conclusions would, however, be subject to the scrutiny of a
select committee which would be of a new kind having power to make
recommendations affecting these issues. The committee would also have the
power to suggest possible reform to conventions, either by their re-
interpretation, their abolition or by the creation of new conventions.  It might
propose such reforms, but it could not require their implementation.  The
question whether conventions are applied would also fall within its inquiry. It
would also address the further need  to examine not only individual practices,
but also the relationships between practices within a more fundamental theory
of the constitution, posing such questions as: How should the constitution
function?  What purposes should conventions serve? 66 The Committee would
have a permanent existence and present its report and recommendations
annually to Parliament.  The  enforcement of conventions would remain as at
present, a matter for the political process beyond the scrutiny of the Committee.
The reasons for this proposal and the means by which it might work are
considered below, but it is first necessary to consider its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction
A significant problem would be the opacity of conventional change.  It may be
a matter of concern that  the constitution develops in a manner which is largely
invisible to the general public - and, in part, deliberately kept secret from us-
but it is all the more disconcerting to find that senior civil servants are not clear
                                                          
66  As Brazier observes, there are currently no conventions which require popular approval even for
fundamental constitutional change, and no special majorities are required for constitutional Bills.
Issues such as these which touch upon the democratic legitimacy of the constitution, are matters which
the Committee might usefully examine, along with the question as to whether constitutional reform
ought to proceed only on a multi-party basis.  See   Brazier New Labour, New Constitution (1998) 49
NILQ 1, 8.
17
themselves whether certain practices are conventions.67   This exposes a
problem of jurisdiction: if the committee were to have orders of reference
requiring it to consider the conventions of the constitution, it begs questions of
definition. First there must be agreement about what is a convention.68 But even
if this matter is settled there will be problems in identifying which
constitutional practices are accepted as binding because this may be a matter of
genuine dispute.  However, the significance of the lack of agreement as to what
constitutes a convention can be overstated.   The proposed committee ought to
concern itself in all non-legal practices which are relevant to the constitution.
Since this is itself an indeterminate issue  the select committee should
investigate and consider any practices which, in its opinion, might have
constitutional significance.
Reasons for the Proposal
 The  Role of the Select Committee.
It would be important to preserve the advantages of the present system whilst
allowing for democratic participation. The executive should have, as at present,
the power to initiate and propose changes to conventions, but it is important to
ensure that the constitution for the time being is not determined by the
executive in the absence of parliamentary participation.  The initiation of
possible constitutional change and the interpretation of the scope of
constitutional practices would thus be as at present. The proper scope and
meaning of the constitution ought to be a matter which engages a democratic
process. This would in part be achieved by the composition of the committee as
well as its annual report to Parliament, which Parliament may choose to debate.
This power of initiation would preserve the adaptability of the constitution,
which is one of the key advantages afforded by conventions. Conventions
permit modernisation notwithstanding the deficiencies in the formal
constitution.   Those who are daily engaged in the business of government are
those most likely to identify the need for change and be in a position to propose
                                                          
67  This can be seen in the exchange between Sir Robin Butler and Peter Hennessy concerning what the
document then known as Questions of Procedure for Ministers.  This is described by  Hennessy in The
Hidden Wiring, loc.cit. at pp. 37 et seq.
68   See  above.
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solutions which, in their opinion, at least, meet the exigencies of the situation.
To remove this initiating power from the practitioners to some other body not
intimately engaged in the continuous working of the constitution would
threaten the capacity for spontaneous invention without necessarily ensuring
the appropriateness of the solution to constitutional difficulties.
The select committee should also examine the interrpetation of conventional
obligations. The power to interpret a rule is the very power which gives the rule
its life this should not be a power within the final determination of the
executive, which may itself be bound by that interpretation.
In  a system of permanent evolution the select committee  would require the
outcomes of this process of change  to be justified. The explanation of change
would expose the inner workings of government to more robust questioning;
where changes might appear self-serving, or otherwise ill-advised, the reasons
would have to be explained and defended.   This committee could offer a
profound impact on the current conventional system by ensuring wider
influences over and reflection on the evolutionary process.
The committee would also have the fundamentally important power of
commenting on the extent to which  political actors have respected particular
conventional obligations.  It would have the power to inquire into the reasons
for certain behaviour which may have breached a convention and to comment
in its annual report to parliament on this.  However, three difficulties in this
role are envisaged:
(a) How is the committee to be informed of breaches of convention and
otherwise gain access to relevant information?  (b)  How will the committee
comprised of partisan politicians reach consensus?  (c)  What will be its
relationship with ministers and civil servants?
(a)  Information
The operation of the constitution is a subtle process  the details of which will
not always be apparent to the interested outsider. The committee will not
routinely be informed of the exchanges between civil servants, or Palace,
Cabinet Office and No. 10. It would be impossible to expect its members to
search into every governmental action which might have conventional
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significance.69      It would in practice largely be reactive to complaints and
suggestions, although it would not be prevented from acting of its own
initiative.  Any MP, civil servant, or even a member of the public  might invite
the  select committee to inquire into a particular matter.  The committee would
not be bound to act on each complaint, but it could determine which it would
investigate.70  In practice it would be likely to concentrate only on  the most
constitutionally significant issues.
(b)  Adversarial parties
One of the well-rehearsed limitations of select committees is that members
recruited from the  majority party are notoriously reluctant to criticise the
decisions of their own  government. The beau ideal of the committee system is
that its members behave as parliamentarians rather than as party loyalists,
although this expectation is an unrealistic one.  The problem of partisanship
could be an acute issue where the committee were looking at non-obedience to
a particular convention in a concrete factual setting which was politically
sensitive.  Questions of loyalty to party, hopes  of advancement and all the
other pressures of back-bench life could compromise the neutrality of the
committee's work.  The solution to this  problem might be to give particular
weight to the opinion of an appointed panel of non partisan experts. This is
considered further below.
(c)  Relationship with Ministers and Civil Servants
The third issue concerns the workings of the committee in identifying  whether
a breach has occurred.  It would  be necessary to receive information from
ministers and civil servants.  In the past there have been well rehearsed
problems in ensuring that this information has been forthcoming, and that the
principle of  accountability is respected.71  This issue has in part been addressed
                                                          
69  This would not be without definitional complexity to which reference has already been made.
70  This is consistent with the present system for select committees under SO  152.
71   There remains a problem of an "accountability gap".   The dichotomy between responsibility and
accountability  which limits ministerial responsibility to Parliament means that accountability can be
problematic where a minister blames a civil servant for some failure and subsequently directs that
individual not to appear before a select committee.  This is permitted under the Cabinet Office
document Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees (1997) which replaced the so
called "Osmotherly Rules".   Notoriously, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry refused to allow
the civil servants involved in aspects of the Westland affair to appear before the Commons Defence
Select Committee (see HC 519 (1985-6) Cmnd 9916 (1986).    This problem has in part been addressed
in the Parliamentary Resolutions (see above n. 45).  Although civil servants still give evidence to select
committees under the direction of ministers, the minister must impress civil servants to be as helpful as
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following the report of Sir Richard Scott into the sale of arms to Iraq and the
Nolan Inquiry into Standards in Public Life.72 The obligations in the new
Ministerial Code 73 and the Code of Practice on Access to Government
Information74  require ministers to be as open as possible with Parliament and
to withhold information only when permitted under the common standards of
the Code of Practice.  Ministers also have a duty to require civil servants giving
evidence on their behalf to  parliamentary committees to be as helpful as
possible.  These obligations create a presumption in favour of openness,
although the scope for withholding information is still considerable.75
Enforcement
The remaining issue, it will be recalled,  concerns the  application and
enforcement of conventions.  Individual conventions vary in their significance,
and the consequences of a breach of any one convention can differ so much
that enforcement should remain a matter for the ordinary political process and
not for the Select Committee.  For example, the judgment of whether  a
minister who leaks cabinet information to the press should resign depends on
the broad interplay of party politics, the breadth of support for the minister, as
well as the sensitivity of the information divulged.76  Questions of confidence
and of party support are more accurately identified in the Commons and the
party beyond it rather than a more narrowly composed select committee.
Whilst the Committee might properly hold an opinion on whether a convention
had been respected, it could not impose a sanction if it were breached.
                                                                                                                                                                     
possible in providing accurate, truthful and full information. (HC resolution para (iv)).  Ultimately,
however,  Parliament still lacks power to compel  Ministers to answer questions and cannot require
civil servants to give evidence to select committees.
72   See the  Scott Report n.12 above. The First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life
cm 2850 (1995) (the Nolan Report).
73  Cabinet Office, July 1997
74  2nd edition, January 1997
75  A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but it is noteworthy that the Code was
originally introduced in 1994 and revised in 1997 to make more explicit the presumption in favour of
disclosure. The Code is available on  the worldwide web: http://www.open.gov.uk/.  A future  Freedom
of Information Act  may also have a profound impact on this issue.
76   See, for example, para 24 of the First Report of the Public Service Committee: "Ministerial
Accountability and Responsibility". HC 234  Session 1996-1997.
21
The committee could not have a power to order that a particular convention be
obeyed or a penalty be imposed for its breach without, in substance, juridifying
the system of conventions.  Only following a trial to establish guilt could the
committee consider the exercise of a compulsory power, for example an order
that a minister be dismissed. It would alter our understanding both of
conventions and select committees if an opinion of a  select committee were to
have a priority over the wider political process.  The committee armed with
coercive power would in substance be a court, and conventions would acquire
inflexible characteristics previously unknown in our constitution.  For these
reasons the committee's work should be confined to examining both the
structure of the constitution and whether the rules are respected,  without
venturing into the difficult political issues surrounding the sanction which
might be applied for a particular breach.
Conventions and the Select Committee77
 The impact of the Committee on  constitutional conventions would depend
upon the esteem in which political actors held the committee.  Its authority
would depend both upon  the  reputation of the members who comprised it and
that of the experts by whom it would be advised. If political actors accepted
that a group of expert MPs  consulting widely amongst lay expertise was an
effective forum to pronounce upon constitutional practices  the opinions of the
committee would be accepted as authoritative.  Manipulation and re-
interpretation of conventions  could become less straightforward than at
present.
At least this ought to be so where the committee's recommendations were
supported by a clear majority of the members of the committee.  Some
difficulties might arise where the committee  was unable to arrive at a
consensus on a particular constitutional practice. Much would   depend on the
reasons why this were so, but it might suggest that a fatal absence of the
necessary acceptance that the practice is binding.78  It might signal the
                                                          
77   Sampford loc. cit. ventures similar conclusions to those that follow about the Australian experiment
in codifying conventions. Since this was achieved there appears to have been little controversy about
the meaning and application of those conventions "recognised and declared".  It may be too early to
appreciate the full long terms effects of the experiment.
78  The question concerning the definition of a convention which is again posed by this issue has been
discussed above.
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weakness of the practice as a convention thereby creating an opportunity for
politicians to abandon or modify it.
Disagreement along party lines would simply weaken any recommendation the
committee might make. However, the possibility of this ought to be minimised
provided that considerable importance were attached to consensus amongst the
panel of experts  from outside parliament who are hors de combat (see below).
As in Australia the  recommendations of an authoritative  committee avoiding
partisanship could have the effect of  recognising certain conventions and
declaring their scope.  Its views would carry weight so that if subsequently
politicians suggested a modified interpretation of the convention the
recommendation of the committee would often be preferred. It would be less
easy to deny the existence of a particular convention.  There would be no
higher alternative source to cite to oppose the committee. Politicians would
tend to ensure their behaviour fell within the ambit of the recognised rule.
Compliance would be enhanced by virtue of the political consequences which
might punish disobedience.
There might, however, be instances in which  politicians might have bona fide
reasons for departing from the practice as declared. But in this case also the
Opposition, armed with an authoritative contrary view,  would  find it easier to
call the government to account, and the onus would be on the latter to defend
and justify its position.  Textual exegesis would not be as important in this
debate as it might have been if conventions were codified, since the report of a
committee would be unlikely to have been drafted as a quasi legislative
measure.79  Moreover, politics and not the committee would be the ultimate
arbiter.  But the political debate would perhaps focus more on the scope of  the
declared rules, their purposes and their exceptions rather than questioning the
existence of the  rule. Admittedly, there would be exceptional cases in which
political actors, perhaps with the support of large parliamentary majorities,
might not always be restrained by the committee's views.   But the Opposition
would be better armed to meet such a challenge.
The Panel of Experts
                                                                                                                                                                     
79  Sampford loc. cit.
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The Select Committee should be  able to draw upon the widest possible
constitutional expertise.  This might  be achieved  through its membership, the
witnesses which it chose to examine, and through the assistance of
constitutional experts outside Parliament. This  would allow the committee to
consult and to receive informed opinion in a manner which would not be
possible by the exclusive means of calling witnesses. It might also permit the
influence of more critical and informed opinion drawn from outside the
constitutional machine. 80    
The power to appoint such expertise is already promulgated under SO 152.
Specialist advisers can be appointed either to supply information not readily
available or to elucidate matters of complexity within a committee's orders of
reference.  However, the role of this panel of expert advisers would go beyond
this and this make the select committee unique.  There would be a presumption
(which might itself develop as a convention) that if a consensus of opinion
were established amongst the members of the panel,  the select committee
should not depart from it without sufficient and clearly stated reasons.   If the
committee did wish to differ, the  panel's views should be published in the
committee's annual report to Parliament. If the select committee simply divided
along party lines,  the opinion of the panel and not that of the committee might
be accepted as more authoritative.  The conflict of opinion might conceivably
engage public debate.  The identification of appropriate constitutional
behaviour would then be a matter for political actors to determine by drawing
upon the views of panel and committee respectively, as well as any  public
discussion which of these divided opinions generated.
 The form of the Select Committee
According to one view, the  proposed select committee would not be
constituted in the same manner as a departmental select committee, since its
work would not be associated with a department of state. Departmental select
committees have not usually been required to produce "constitutional"
                                                          
80 Academics participated in the Australian Constitutional Convention which lead to the codification of
some conventions: see Sampford,  loc. cit.
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reports.81 Also, the special reliance upon the panel of experts locates the
proposed committee's composition and role outside the existing structure.
An alternative possibility would simply be to adapt the select committee
system to accommodate the new function.  According to this view one
possibility might be to extend  and   adapt the role of  Select Committee on
Public Administration so that it could  (under revised orders of reference)
become  suited to fulfil the task of scrutinising  conventions.  Its current terms
of reference are to examine the reports of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, and
to consider matters relating to the quality and standards of administration
provided by Civil Service departments, and other matters relating to the Civil
Service.  At present the Committee receives and scrutinises82 reports from the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration,   as well as reports from the
Health Service Commissioners for England, Scotland & Wales.  It also
examines the quality of administration within the civil service. Its role
embraces that formerly undertaken by the Public Service Committee.
Although it may take evidence from experts outside Parliament, it is not
advised by a permanently appointed panel of experts.
However, the difficulty with this possibility is that its terms of reference are
already  extensive. Any further expansion in the role of the Committee would
unreasonably overload its  membership and weaken its impact.   We need not
look beyond the burdens of its current major review of public service
accountability to appreciate its lack of suitability for the additional and
extensive task of scrutinising conventions.   For this reason it has been
proposed to establish a new and distinct select committee rather than to adapt
an existing one. This new sui generis  select committee, like the departmental
select  committees,  would have a permanent existence.
Conclusion
Conventions are prescriptive of constitutional behaviour, but there is neither a
body to declare their existence, nor to interpret them  nor to elucidate their
meaning, nor to impose a sanction for their breach. They are created by
political insiders and operated within the exigencies and limitations of
                                                          
81  This conclusion is supported by Brazier, New Labour, New Constitution (1998) 49 NILQ 1, 6.
However,  he concedes that some of their reports have been constitutionally significant.
82  SO 146.
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adversarial politics. Conventions may be adapted to suit the interests of the
government of the day. They are the "handmaiden" of the party in power83  yet
they are the means by which an unsatisfactory and hopelessly archaic formal
constitution has been adapted to modern political values.  They can be re-cast
by those whom they are supposed to control, deleted when they become
inconvenient, and ignored when they are embarrassing. They are but chaff
before the heavy armour of a government with a large parliamentary majority.
But any attempt comprehensively to juridify them would ultimately fail, and
attempts at codification, even if practicable, would tend to fossilise a system in
which  fluid mutability is  its chief virtue as much as it is its frailty. And
crystallisation must be a limited  venture within current conceptions of the role
of the judiciary within the separation of powers.
The buttressing in the  nineteenth century of the undemocratic control of a
major lever of constitutional change as a conservative reaction to the extension
of the franchise requires review.  This is particularly timely now that Labour
appears to place an increased emphasis upon addressing the democratic deficit
in the  UK constitution.  The UK has just crossed the threshold of major
constitutional re-alignment following devolution.  This will provide a major
accelerant to the growth of new conventions to regulate and relationship
between Westminster and the devolved institutions.
Accordingly it has been argued that within a system of accountable government
the democratic supervision of conventions could be achieved by Parliament.
There should be a more reflective,  inclusive and transparent deliberation on
the evolution and application of conventions.   It has been proposed that a new
and distinct select committee be established which will scrutinise the
development, interpretation and abandonment of conventions.  It will be
advised by a panel of experts and will make an annual report to Parliament.
This will provide an authoritative body whose work will have the effect of
recognising  and declaring conventions and exposing those who breach them to
public obloquy.  The merits of this proposal are that parliamentary scrutiny is
established without sacrificing the flexibility of the constitution and thus its
ability to accommodate change.   The Committee will have no power to impose
a sanction but whilst it recognises that conventions are prescriptive it also
meets the objection that they must be capable of evolution.  At its heart is the
                                                          
83  This follows  a fortiori  from Brazier, loc. cit. who uses this term in relation to the Constitution
itself.
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principle that constitutionally significant behaviour must be justified to
Parliament.   This would be achieved in a more systematic and reflective
manner than at present. If this were achieved it would significantly contribute
to New Labour's "People's Constitution".
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